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Анотацiя. У статтi обговорюється значення неджастифiкацiонiзму як
важливої частини фiлософiї критичного рацiоналiзму Карла Попера та
панкритичного рацiоналiзму Вiльяма Бартлi. Здiйснюється аналiз та кри-
тична оцiнка тлумачень та спроб розвитку критичного рацiоналiзму, за-
пропонованих Девiдом Мiлером та Аланом Масґрейвом. Обґрунтовується
думка, що заперечення Мiлером релевантностi пiдстав для рацiональностi
суперечить поглядам Попера i не пiдтримується аргументацiєю Попера
й Бартлi, що лежить в основi неджастифiкацiонiзму. Крiм того, це запе-
речення є неприйнятним, оскiльки рацiональнiсть неможливо звести до
коректностi аргументiв та «рiшень» щодо визнання обговорюваних по-
ложень iстинними чи хибними; для неї необхiдне зважування пiдстав на
користь та проти наявних альтернатив. З’ясовується, що тлумачення Ма-
сґрейвом неджастифiкацiонiзму та критичного рацiоналiзму як погляду,
згiдно якого прийняття пропозицiї є рацiональним, якщо ця пропозицiя
найкраще витримує критичне оцiнювання, є вразливим перед проблемою
нескiнченного регресу положень, на основi яких має здiйснюватися це
оцiнювання. Пропонується й обґрунтовується розумiння неджастифiка-
цiонiзму Попера та Бартлi як концепцiї, що ототожнює рацiональнiсть
з вiдкритiстю до критичної дискусiї в пошуках iстини та наголошує, що
хоча така дискусiя й потребує прийняття певних положень без їх обґрун-
тування, як непроблематичних або правдоподiбних для сторiн дискусiї,
цi положення не мають розглядатися як непорушний фундамент, що не
може бути ревiзований. В перспективi критичного рацiоналiзму, такi по-
ложення вiдiграють роль, подiбну до ролi «безпосереднього знання» у
класичному рацiоналiзмi та емпiризмi; проте вони розглядаються як такi,
що можуть бути помилковими i є вiдкритими для критичного обговорення
й перегляду.
Ключовi слова: критичний рацiоналiзм, неджастифiкацiонiзм, пiдстави,
ревiзiя, погляд.
Abstract. This paper discusses the meaning of non-justificationism as an
important part of Karl Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism and Willi-
am Bartley’s philosophy of pancritical rationalism. Сonstruals and attempted
developments of critical rationalism by David Miller and Alan Musgrave are
analysed and critically evaluated. The case is made that Miller’s rejection of
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the relevance of reasons for rationality runs counter to Popper’s view and is not
supported by Popper’s and Bartley’s non-justificationist arguments. Besides, it
is untenable because rationality cannot be reduced to the validity of arguments
plus truth-value attributing «decisions» but essentially involves weighing up
reasons for and against available options. With respect to Musgrave’s construal
of non-justificationism and critical rationalism as the view that believing a
proposition is rational if the proposition best survives critical scrutiny, it is
argued that it is vulnerable to the problem of the infinite regress of critici-
zers (positions with which the scrutiny is to be carried out). The case is made
that Popper’s-Bartley’s non-justificationism is to be understood as the identi-
fication of rationality with the openness to critical discussion in the search for
truth and the claim that such discussion does not require ultimate unrevisable
foundations, although it necessarily involves positions that are accepted for the
purposes of the argument at hand without being provided with justification.
In the perspective of critical rationalism, such positions play the role simi-
lar to that of «immediate knowledge» of classical rationalism and empiricism;
however, unlike the latter, they are considered as fallible, open to examination,
and revisable.
Keywords: critical rationalism, non-justificationism, reasons, revision, belief.
Introduction
One of the most important and controversial positions of the epis-
temology of Karl Popper and his followers is called «non-justificationism».
The term obviously means the negation of something called «justifica-
tionism». The opposition, in these terms, was introduced by Popper’s pupil
and collaborator William Bartley. In the book Retreat to Commitment1,
Bartley opposed Popper’s critical rationalism and his own purportedly
improved version of it, comprehensively critical (pancritical) rationalism,
to the dominant traditional notion of rationality he dubbed «justificatio-
nism» — the view that for a belief to be rational, it must be justified by
sound argument, or by sufficient or good reasons. The relationship between
Popper’s and Bartley’s view of the matter is not quite clear and requires
detailed discussion beyond the scope of this paper. What is clear is that
Popper had readily accepted the construal of his general conception of
rationality, critical rationalism, in terms of the negation of justificatio-
nism. Popper’s non-justificationism is most explicit and salient in his book
Realism and the Aim of Science.2 It is worth noting that this book, as
well as two other books in the trilogy Postscript to The Logic of Scientific
Discovery, was prepared for publication under the editorship of Bartley;
probably, this had some influence on the formulations that relate to justi-
fication and non-justificationism.
1Bartley W. The Retreat to Commitment. — La Salle, Illinois : Open Court, 1984.
2Popper K. Realism and the Aim of Science. — London : Hutchinson, 1983.
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Popper’s-Bartley’s non-justificationism gave rise to controversies in
evaluative and interpretative dimensions. With respect to evaluation,
most Popperians highly prize non-justificationism, whereas many other
epistemologists tend to consider it as unacceptable scepticism, or even
irrationalism. With respect to interpretation (that involves also attempts
at development), Popper’s-Bartley’s non-justificationism became a matter
of controversy between Popperian epistemologists, especially two of the
most prominent, David Miller and Alan Musgrave. In this article, I outline
and critically discuss their conceptions of critical rationalism and non-
justificationism, argue that they essentially diverge from Popper’s and
Bartley’s views in ways that make critical rationalism more vulnerable,
and elucidate Popper’s and Bartley’s views on these matters.
The controversies at issue have much to do with what I propose to
call «the negativist legend» about Popper’s philosophy. (This is a sort
of counterpart to «the positivist legend», against which Popper and his
followers made so much just complaint.) Roughly, it is that Popper’s phi-
losophy is all about negation, falsification, refutation, argument against. In
the most unsympathetic versions, the legend is that Popper’s philosophy
is just a kind of discouraging skepticism, or irrationalism, and that it is
preposterously defying common sense. One of the most glaring examples
is D. Stove’s book Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists, in whi-
ch Popper is claimed to be a modern irrationalist, alongside with Lacatos,
Kuhn, and Feyerabend, because «[t]hey doubt, or deny outright, that there
can be any reason to believe any scientific theory; and a fortiori they doubt
or deny, for example, that there has been any accumulation of knowledge in
recent centuries».3 Stove’s view got approval of the reputed contemporary
analytic philosopher David Papineau, in two reviews in Times Literary
Supplement.4 The view is popularised by Stephen Law in the books The
Philosophy Gym (a bestseller that introduces a lay reader to the most
important philosophical issues in a very engaging way) and The Great Phi-
losophers. In a chapter of The Philosophy Gym, Law attributes to Popper
the view «that we never possess any grounds for supposing that a scienti-
fic theory is true».5 In The Great Philosophers, Law directly misrepresents
3Stove D. Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists. — Oxford, New York :
Pergamon Press, 1982. — p. viii.
4Papineau D. Review of Popper and After by David Stove // Times Literary
Supplement. — 1983. — July 1; Papineau D. Review of Knowledge and the Body-
Mind Problem and The Myth of the Framework by Karl Popper // Times Literary
Supplement. — 1995. — June 23.
5Law S. Philosophy Gym. — London : Headline Review, 2004. — p. 126.
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Popper’s view — he writes that Popper, in effect, accepts Hume’s conclusi-
on that beliefs (1) that tomorrow morning the sun will appear over the hori-
zon and (2) that tomorrow morning a million-mile-wide luminous panda
will appear over the horizon are equally reasonable.6
1. David Miller’s conception of critical rationalism:
doing away with reasons
Surprisingly, «the negativist legend» seems to find support in the
construal of critical rationalism by David Miller, who was a friend and
collaborator of Popper and is perhaps the most reputed among Popper’s
modern followers.7 Miller seems to identify justificationism with the view
that rationality has something to do with sufficient (conclusive), or good
(inconclusive) reasons, or even just reasons. Accordingly, Miller, as a non-
justificationist, goes so far as to deny the existence of both sufficient and
good reasons :
The subjective feeling of being in possession of good reasons may exist.
But as far as rational thought is concerned, evaluation in terms of good
reasons is a pure epiphenomenon.8
Although Miller admits the existence of reasons in the subjective sense,
he denies that they may be good, and he denies that reasons have some
job to do for rational thought:
Reasons exist, no doubt, at least in the subjective sense, but not good
ones [. . . ] But this does not imply that rationality is impossible, either in
intellectual affairs or in practice. Reason has a job to do in every sphere;
reasons, poor things, have not.9
This nearly repeats the statement by David Papineau: «Popper’s official doctrine is
that we never have any reason to believe that any scientific theory is true» (Papineau
D. Review of Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem and The Myth of the Framework
by Karl Popper). Although this statement is pretty similar to some things Popper said
about reasons for holding a scientific theory to be true (I will dwell on this point a bit
later), it is very misleading because taken out of the context and not provided with
appropriate explanations and qualifications (which Popper had given).
6Law S. The Great Philosophers. — London : Quercus, 2007. — p. 175.
7An example of another Popperian author who follows Miller’s construal of critical
rationalism is Antoni Diller, who attempts to criticise Bartley from these positions.
– See Diller A. On Critical and Pancritical Rationalism // Philosophy of the Social
Sciences. — 2012. — Vol. 43 (2). — P. 127–156.
8Miller D. Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defense. — La Salle, Illinois :
Open Court, 1994. — p. 66.
9Ibid. — p. 52.
28 Non-justificationism and Popper’s philosophy
On Miller’s view, the only thing that matters for rationality is criticism,
negative argument, attempts to refute a theory.
Miller’s contentions, although presented as a restatement of critical
rationalism, go far beyond Popper and Bartley. For Popper, for one, it
was a perfectly usual and unproblematic thing to claim having weighty, or
good, or «more or less sufficient» reasons. Let me adduce some conspicuous
examples.
In a lecture delivered at the University of Tübingen in 1981, Popper
formulated three «principles that form the basis of every rational discus-
sion, that is, of every discussion undertaken in the search for truth»; one
of these principles is «the principle of rational discussion: we want to try,
as impersonally as possible, to weigh up our reasons for and against a
theory»10 (Italics mine). From this, it is clear that Popper believed that
there are reasons, both for and against a theory, and that they may be
weighed up so that some turn out weightier than others (at least, for a
person), and that is just what rationality is about.
In the book Realism and the Aim of Science, Popper formulates another
important principle: «we should not depart from common sense [. . . ] wit-
hout some fairly good reason».11 It seems that Miller goes against this
principle in two ways: first, he departs from common sense without fairly
good reason; second, he denies that there are such things as good reasons.
And Popper repeatedly says that there are good critical reasons (by “cri-
tical reasons” he usually means reasons to prefer one theory over another):
We can have good reasons – that is, good critical reasons – for thinki-
ng that we have learned something important: that we have progressed
toward truth.12
I can examine my guess critically, and if it withstands severe criticism,
then this fact may be taken as a good critical reason in favour of it.13
Miller is not unaware of this. In his later book, Out of Error, he com-
plains that Popper «regrettably, [. . . ] in several places [. . . ] slipped into
what look like justificationist theses, saying for example that “we must at
least in some cases be able to give reasons for the intuitive claim that
10Popper K. In Search of a Better World. — London and New York : Routledge, 1992.
— p. 199.
11Popper K. Realism and the Aim of Science. — p. 47.
Of course, this principle provides us with no «criteria» or «algorithm», for one needs
in each individual case to judge for oneself what accords with, and what departs from,
common sense, and what reasons are «fairly good».
12Ibid. — p. 25.
13Popper K. Conjectures and Refutations. — New York : Basic Books, 1962. — p. 233.
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we have come nearer to the truth, or that some theory T1 is superseded
by some new theory T2, because T2 is more like the truth than is T1”
(1972, Chapter 2, §7)».14 So, Miller sees justificationism even in such a
modest claim about requirement in some cases to provide reasons (even
without any such adjective as «good») for the preference of one theory
over another in terms of nearing the truth. As for «critical reasons» (or
«negative reasons»), Miller’s view is that Popper was mistaken:
Critical rationalism need have no more truck with negative reasons than
it does with positive reasons. There are no negative reasons either; nor do
we need them for rational thought and action.15
There is one important point in Popper’s writings concerned with
reasons that may need explanation in order to avoid misinterpretation.
It is concerned with a very important kind of statements, the one at the
very center of Popper’s interest — scientific theories that are, or have as
their parts, universal statements (of laws of nature).16 About such theories,
Popper argued (with reference to Bartley) that it is impossible to justify
them by giving «“positive reasons” [. . . ]; reasons, that is, for holding them
to be true, or to be at least “probable” (in the sense of the probability
calculus)»;17 however, «we can often give reasons for regarding one theory
as preferable to another» by «pointing out that, and how, one theory
has hitherto withstood criticism better than another».18 Popper proposed
to call such reasons «critical reasons». Two points need to be taken into
account here.
The first is that the term «positive reasons» does not mean «reasons
for»; it is used by Popper rather to imply ensurance of truth sensu stricto
(rather than being a better approximation to the truth, as compared with
known alternatives) or high probability (in the sense of the probability
calculus).
The second point to be taken into account is that this case concerns
scientific theories, and it is not generalizable to all kinds of positions
14Miller D. Out of Error. Further Essays on Critical Rationalism. — Aldershot :
Ashgate, 2006. — p. 126.
15Miller D. Critical Rationalism. — p. 70.
16Roughly, a universal statement is a statement that all things of a certain class have
a certain conceptually independent property (such that does not belong to the class by
definition, is not part of the concept of the class), where the class is open. A class is
open if it is (at least, potentially) infinite, and includes all conceptually fitting things
that exist, existed, or will ever exist.
17Popper K. Realism and the Aim of Science. — p. 19.
18Ibid.
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(statements). For example, with respect to a (meta)statement that a
certain scientific theory is false, we can have pretty good reasons to be-
lieve that the statement is true. Or, if we have pretty weighty reasons
to prefer one scientific theory (A) over another (B), we have exactly the
same — and, therefore, just as weighty — reasons to believe in the truth
of the (meta)statement that A is better than B.19 Outside science, as well
as in science with respect to non-universal statements, there are lots of
positions such that we can have pretty good reasons to believe them to
be true. For example: «The Earth is round rather than cubic», «Donald
Trump is the President of USA», «Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939
and so unleashed the World War II». In particular, whenever the list of
logically possible alternatives is limited and known (for example, «God
exists» and «God does not exist»), the reasons to believe a certain position
are the same (and, thus, just as weighty) as the reasons to prefer it over
the alternative ones.
If we consider Popper’s and Bartley’s arguments against justificatio-
nism, we can see that they have nothing essentially to do with the view that
only refutations or «negative» arguments, in the sense of arguments that
provide reasons against, matter whereas «positive» arguments, in the sense
of arguments that provide reasons for, do not. Thus, Bartley introduced the
term «justificationism» in the context of «the problem of the limits of rati-
onality», which is that if we are required to justify our beliefs, we can never
do this without appealing to some other beliefs that remain unjustified, and
so we can never achieve justification. From this, a lot of philosophers argued
that we have no choice but to commit ourselves dogmatically to some
foundational framework — «that there is an essential logical limitation to
rationality: the rational defense and examination of ideas must, for logical
reasons, be terminated by an arbitrary and irrational appeal to what can be
called dogmas or absolute presuppositions».20 Bartley confronted this view
by arguing that «criticism can be carried out successfully and satisfactorily
without [. . . ] any resort to dogmas or authorities», that «it is not necessary
to mark off a special class of statements, the justifiers, which do the justi-
fying and criticizing but are not open to criticism»,21 and thus «there
19Popper admitted this, and pointed out that «there is a world of difference between
a meta-theory that asserts that a theory A is better than a theory B, and another
meta-theory that asserts that theory A is, in fact, true (or “probable”)», and «there is
a world of difference between arguments that might be considered as valid or weighty
reasons in support of the one or the other of these two meta-theories» (Ibid. — p. 23).
20Bartley W. The Retreat to Commitment. — p. 221.
21Ibid. — p. 223.
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are no limits to rationality in the sense that one must postulate dogmas
or presuppositions that must be held exempt from review».22 However,
Bartley’s talk of «criticism» may happen to be misleading, because we
are prone to interpret «criticism» as argument against.23 In fact, Bartley’s
argument has nothing to do with establishing that arguments against are
better off than arguments for. It establishes that we can reasonably argue
— whether against or for a position — starting with premises that aren’t
justified, and that we need not commit ourselves to these premises (take
them as «dogmas or presuppositions that must be held exempt from revi-
ew») — instead, we can tentatively accept them as unproblematic, or as
plausible enough, as far as we can judge, for the purpose at hand.
To summarize, Popper’s and Bartley’s non-justificationist arguments
do not warrant any of the following contentions.
• (Good, weighty, etc.) reasons do not exist or, if they exist, they «have
no job», as far as rationality is concerned.
• The only arguments (reasons) that matter for rationality are those
against the statement at issue.
• There are no reasons for holding a statement to be true, for whatever
statement.
Popper’s and Bartley’s non-justificationist arguments demonstrate the
following.
• Against justificationist (uncritical) rationalism: The demand that
every position, to be rationally accepted, should be justified, is self-
22Ibid. — p. 221.
This Bartley’s argument can be considered as a generalization of Popper’s «Resolution
of Fries’s Trilemma» in The Logic of Scientific Discovery: although no basic statement
is absolutely basic, any can be tested with the use of further basic statements, this
procedure of testing should stop somewhere (at a point that is arbitrary from the
purely logical point of view) — and it stops «at statements about whose acceptance or
rejection the various investigators are likely to reach agreement» (if it was not the case
that scientists pretty often agree as to what is observed, science would be impossible)
(Popper K. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. — London : Hutchinson, 1959. — P. 104-
105).
23Bartley himself seems to make such a slip and to be the source of this mis-
understanding, in describing his proposition to contrast justificationist and non-
justificationist theories of criticism as a generalization of Popper’s distinction between
verification and falsification (Bartley W. Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth.
— La Salle, Illinois : Open Court, 1990. — p. 237). In fact, non-justificationism is not
a generalization of falsificationism (see, however, the previous footnote); it answers
an entirely different problem: the problem of infinite justificationist regress and the
purported inevitableness of dogmatic commitment is entirely unlike the problem of the
possibility of inductive inference and verification; the non-justificationist solution to the
former, unlike falsificationist solution of the latter, need not involve «negativism».
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defeating.
• Against irrationalism: Nevertheless, we may — and better do — hold
the rationalist attitude, in the sense of being open to critical discussion
(aimed at truth) that may make us revise our beliefs.
• Against «the theory of unrevisable-framework-bound rationality»
(«the commitment theory»): For a rational discussion to be possible and
fruitful, we do not need to accept some positions dogmatically, as exempt
from critical discussion. Instead, we may proceed on tentative (plausible,
in the light of what we presently seem to know) premises.
• Generally : No ultimate, unrevisable foundation is needed for rational
discussion.
Of course, the fact that Miller’s view about reasons is different from
Popper’s view does not mean that it is wrong. The detailed enough discus-
sion and criticism of Miller’s views require much more space than this
paper allows. However, I will make some relevant points here.
Miller complains that it is not clear «what good reasons are supposed
to be good for».24 I think that the answer is that usually, when the word
combination «good reasons» is used, one means reasons that are good
enough for the purpose at hand. In epistemological context, the purpose is
a (tentative) judgment as to whether the position (statement, or theory)
at issue is true, or good enough approximation to the truth, or false
and not good enough. This, of course, does not explain what counts as
a good reason, or what are the criteria of something being a good reason.
Eventually, it is a matter of personal judgment.
It may be objected that evaluation in terms of good reasons is unsatis-
factory as subjective and woolly. Why not replace it, as Miller seems
to propose, with evaluation in logically neat terms, such as validity of
arguments and refutation?25 I think that there is a pretty good reason
why.
To begin with, there is no sense at all in being interested in provid-
ing merely valid arguments. One can always very easily provide valid
argument for and against any statement. (The simplest valid argument
for any conclusion is a one-premised argument in which the premise is
the same as the conclusion.) What we must be interested in is not merely
valid but sound arguments, that is, valid arguments with true premises.
But how can we know whether the premises are true? Strictly speaking, we
24Miller D. Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defense. — p. 60.
25To my earlier criticisms of his views, Miller answered with an email, where he
explained that his point is that we shouldn’t be interested in providing «good reasons»,
but «should be interested in providing valid critical arguments».
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never know, and logics cannot tell us (except for the uninteresting cases of
tautologies and self-contradictions). At some points, we should just make
our judgments as a matter of informal understanding, or of what just seems
to us to be the case, without further argumentative support.
This does not contradict Miller’s view, since Miller admitted the
necessity of «decisions» or «conjectures» to resolve such conflicts. However,
I think that this admission is not sufficient, and the terms «decisions»
or «conjectures» are likely to be misleading.26 It is not the case that all
there is are valid arguments plus «decisions» or «conjectures» as to whi-
ch statements are to be accepted (classified) as true and which declined
(classified) as false. Things are not as simple as that.
The process of reasoning is not a smooth passage from what seems to
be — or not to be — the case to valid deductive inferences therefrom. If
it were, there would be nothing problematic about it, and there would be
no job for philosophy. Miller’s claim that in order to classify a hypothesis
as false, “[a]ll we need is a false consequence of it”27 is not helpful either,
for we first need to judge whether the consequence is false or true. In the
process of reasoning and rational discussion, disagreement arises exactly
because (and insofar as) we are forced to choose between alternative posi-
tions each of which has consequences that its opponents think to be false
(and even its defenders often find problematic and would probably think
false if they didn’t think that the available alternatives has more clearly
false consequences). Logics cannot resolve such a conflict; all it can do is to
reveal the conflict and help us see what is involved in it.28 When a conflict
is revealed, we must judge what is most likely to be the «weaker» position,
26The term «decision» is appropriate for actions in which volition is involved, but
not for the process of acquiring, holding, and abandoning beliefs. A person can decide
to act in a certain way rather than another, but she cannot decide, and implement the
decision, to believe this rather than that.
The term «conjecture» is used by critical rationalists in two essentially different
senses. There is «conjecture1» as invention of a new idea, or theory, and there is
«conjecture2» as a tentative judgment that an idea, or theory, is true, or false, or
(un)likely to be a good approximation to the truth. These are very different things; a
person can conjecture1 without conjecturing2; conjecture2 is a judgment that follows
conjecture1.
27Miller D. Critical rationalism. – p. 70.
28Cf.: «A valid argument [. . . ] is not so much a proof as a choice. It presents us with
a set of mutually exclusive alternatives. [. . . ] Logical arguments, contrary to popular
belief, cannot force us to accept the truth of their conclusions. They can force us to
choose, but they cannot make the choice for us» (Notturno M. Science and the Open
Society. — Central European University Press, 1999. — p. 71-72). «[I]t is judgments of
our own that are really necessary. Valid arguments play the extremely important role
of clarifying our options. But they cannot make our judgments for us» (Ibid. — p. 146).
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or how we can resolve the conflict with the least loss. Usually, this is not a
matter of straightforward intuitive judgment, or mere conjecture (and even
less so «decision»), that it is A rather than B that should be renounced
as false. Usually, in such conflict situations, judgment is guided by various
considerations about what is involved with (renouncing) A, and what is
involved with (renouncing) B, and judgments of how plausible and how
important the items involved are. So, weighing up of such considerations
(reasons) is necessary, and this cannot be reduced to the validity of the
arguments.
Another relevant and important point is that considerations (reasons)
that are relevant to our judgments (to guide and affect them) are often such
that the position they support does not validly (deductively) follow from
them. To make sense of this relevance in the form of (deductively) valid
argument, additional (bridging) premises are necessary, and these premises
should have the form of a statement that describes the conditions when it
is reasonable to believe in the truth of propositions of a certain kind, that
is, specifies good reasons for believing in the truth of propositions of this
kind.
To make it clearer, let us consider the following example. There are
alternative theories A and B. As far as we can judge, A has hitherto with-
stood criticism better than B. From this, we arrive at the judgment that
(more likely than not) A is nearer the truth than B. Now let us try to
construct a valid argument to that point. First, let us consider the following
argument:
A has hitherto withstood criticism better than B.
Therefore, A is (more likely than not) nearer the truth than B.
This argument is invalid. Now let us consider another argument:
(1) It is reasonable to believe that a theory A is nearer the truth
than an alternative theory B, if A has hitherto withstood criticism
better than B.
(2) A has hitherto withstood criticism better than B.
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that A is nearer the truth than B.
This argument is perfectly valid. However, it involves an additional
premise that describes the conditions of reasonable belief (that is, what
should count as a good reason for believing) that one theory is nearer the
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truth than another. And its conclusion is not that A is nearer the truth
than B, but that it is reasonable to believe that A is nearer the truth than
B.
2. Alan Musgrave’s conception and the problem of the
infinite regress of criticizers
Considerations of the kind discussed at the end of the preceding sec-
tion underlie Alan Musgrave’s construal of non-justificationism as the view
that theories, or statements, or belief-contents cannot be justified but that
belief-acts (such as believing a proposition or preferring one theory over
another) can. There are no reasons for (justification of) «S», where «S» is
a statement, or a theory, or a belief-content; however, there may be reasons
for — we may be justified in — believing that S.29
I think that this is right if understood merely in the sense that it
is reasonable for a person (given his/her epistemic situation) to believe
some propositions and not reasonable to believe some others, and that this
reasonability (and rationality) has much to do with looking for reasons and
weighing them up.
However, there are more disputable aspects to Musgrave’s views on
the problem of justification: he holds that for a belief-act to be reasonable
there should be good reasons or justification for it30, and he attempts to
29Musgrave A. Common Sense, Science and Scepticism. — Cambridge University
Press, 2000. — P. 174-175, 280-282; Musgrave A. How Popper [Might Have] Solved the
Problem of Induction // Philosophy. — 2004. — Vol. 79(1). — P. 3-4; Musgrave A. Criti-
cal Rationalism // E. Suárez-Iñiguez, ed., The Power of Argumentation (Poznań Studi-
es in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 93). — Amsterdam/New
York : Rodopi, 2007. — P. 177-187.
30I had an email correspondence with Musgrave, and he wrote, among other things:
«To say that a belief is reasonable is to say that there is a reason or justification
for it». This assumption is perspicuously implicit in an argument advanced in the
article «Experience and Perceptual Belief»: Musgrave explains that «perceptual be-
liefs are foundational beliefs [. . . ] in the sense that they are not obtained by inference
or argument from other beliefs», and then proceeds to argue that experiences should
count as (non-logical) reasons for belief-acts, because otherwise «none of our “founda-
tional beliefs”, beliefs not obtained by arguing from other beliefs, are reasonable, since
there is no reason for them. Add that any belief obtained by arguing from unreasonable
beliefs is itself unreasonable, and it follows that all beliefs are unreasonable» (Musgrave
A. Experience and Perceptual Belief // S. Parusnikova and R.S.Cohen (eds). Rethink-
ing Popper. — Dordrecht : Springer Science and Business Media, 2009. — p. 13). My
point in the discussion that follows is that for this approach to work, we should loosen
the requirement for reasonability much more than that — to admit to the class of
foundational beliefs an indefinite multitude of non-perceptual beliefs such that the only
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construct a comprehensive critical rationalist theory of belief-act justifi-
cation. I think that he fails in this, because the requirement that belief-
acts, to be reasonable, should be justified brings back the initial problem
with justification — that of the dilemma of infinite justificatory regress or
vicious circle — with no satisfactory solution.
A necessary part of Bartley’s solution to this problem was that justifi-
cation is not required for rationality – in the sense that it is not the case
that for any belief to be reasonable, we should be able to provide justi-
fication for it. Now Musgrave seems to bring the requirement back, and
it does not essentially matter that now it is about belief-acts rather than
belief-contents. The justification problem remains essentially the same: to
justify your believing that S, you need to refer to some further positi-
ons that serve as justifiers, but then you need to justify your believing in
those purported justifiers, to provide second-level justifiers for believing in
the first-level justifiers, and then third-level justifiers for believing in the
second-level justifiers, and so on ad infinitum.
Musgrave attempts to manage the problem in the way that involves
the following two major points.
1) On Musgrave’s view, critical rationalism is the theory of rationali-
ty that assumes, as the most fundamental, the following principle of
reasonableness (rationality):
(CR) It is reasonable to adopt the theory that best survives critical
scrutiny.
Critical rationalist’s justification (reason) for holding critical rationalism
is that it fits the principle (CR), that is, it best survives critical scrutiny.
2) Critical rationalism assumes also the following principle:
(P&T) Perceptual and testimentory beliefs, that is, beliefs ac-
quired from one’s own perceptual experiences or from other peoples’ testi-
monies as to what they have observed or experienced or done31, are not
reason for believing them is that their content just seems to be the case (to a person).
31Musgrave describes the testimentory beliefs as «beliefs acquired from other people»
(Musgrave A. Critical Rationalism. — p. 209), which description allows for all sorts of
beliefs. On the other hand, the examples he adduces and the very name «the testi-
mentory beliefs» suggest that what he really means are beliefs that derive from other
peoples’ testimonies as to what they have observed or experienced or done, which is a
far more limited class of beliefs.
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required to be justified, or are to be considered as «justified by default»,
if no weighty reasons are provided against believing them.32
However, such a justification raises at least two grave objections.
The first, frankly admitted by Musgrave himself:
Self-subsumption is too easy to obtain. «It is reasonable to believe any-
thing said in a paper by Alan Musgrave» subsumes itself, since it occurs
in this paper, but it is crazy epistemic principle. So is «Granny told me
I ought to believe everything she tells me». And «The Pope declared ex
cathedra that everything declared ex cathedra by the Pope is a matter of
faith» is no triumph either.33
Although this seems to be a very grave objection, Musgrave proposes
to «bite the bullet» because, anyway, for obvious logical reasons, no
theory of rationality (reasonableness) can do anything better, in order to
justify its own acceptance, than to appeal to those criteria of rationality
(reasonableness) that this theory itself takes to be the most basic. If it
appealed to some other criteria, it would contradict itself (what it says
about the criteria of reasonableness), and the rationalist cannot tolerate
self-contradiction. Even if self-subsumption is too easy to obtain, it is,
at least, a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a theory to be
rationally acceptable (that is, its absence is a sufficient condition to rule
out the theory as rationally inacceptable).
For me, it seems that such a poor purported justification — one that
provides just as good reason for believing CR as my granny’s claim that
everything she tells me is true provides for my believing this her claim
32Ibid. — pp. 200-202, 206-209.
In (P&T) I have conjoined two principles, as formulated by Musgrave:
(E) «It is reasonable to perceptually believe that P (at time t) if and only if P
has not failed to withstand criticism (at time t)» (Ibid. — p. 207)
and
(T) «A’s testimentory belief that P is reasonable (at time t) if and only if P has
not failed to withstand criticism from A (at time t)» (Ibid. — p. 209).
In other papers, Musgrave makes nearly the same point as (E) by proposing that the
reasons for believing a statement need not necessarily be (believing in) other statements;
instead, they may be perceptual experiences (Musgrave A. How Popper [Might Have]
Solved the Problem of Induction. — P. 4-6; Musgrave A. Experience and Perceptual
Belief. — p. 13). For example, my seeing a cat is a good reason (justifier) for my believing
that there is a cat.
33Musgrave A. Critical Rationalism. — p. 190.
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— is not to be considered as justification, or anything even remotely like
good reason. It would be at least more honest for a critical rationalist to
admit that she believes CR (or some further considerations in its favor
that she can perhaps summon up) with no justification, or reason, except
that it seems reasonable to her. And this is not the only exception to the
requirement of justification for belief-acts that the critical rationalist will
be forced to make, on thinking the matters through. Rather, there will be
no end to such exceptions, as we will see shortly.
The second objection is that if the principle (CR) «It is reasonable
to adopt the theory that best survives critical scrutiny» is granted, there
arises the problem of the infinite regress of criticizers.
Let us think of the following questions. What should critical scrutiny
consist in? How — on what considerations — should we judge that theory
A rather that some alternative theory «best survives critical scrutiny»?
What are legitimate statements to be used as «criticizers»?
Surely, we can’t take any arbitrary statements as equally legitimate,
or good, or weighty criticizers, for this would make all alternative theories
equally neither-bad-nor-good against critical scrutiny. Should we evaluate
criticizers on the same principle, that it is reasonable to adopt critici-
zers that «best survive critical scrutiny»? But this would require second-
level-criticizers for the first-level-criticizers, and there is the same problem
of justification, or reasons, for adopting the second-level-criticizers, and
then third-level-criticizers, and so on ad infinitum. So, we have the infi-
nite regress of criticizers that precisely mirrors the initial problem that
Popper’s-Bartley’s non-justificationism was advanced to solve.
However, is this not helped by the principle (P&T)? This principle
ensures that perceptual and testimentory beliefs can serve as those points
where the regress can be stopped; they can be used as criticizers whose
credentials are granted by default, even before they themselves undergo
critical scrutiny. Does this solve the problem? Unhappily, it does not.
To begin with, how are we to justify our acceptance of the principle
P&T itself? It obviously won’t do to say that it is reasonable because it best
survives critical scrutiny — we do not yet have any means (criticizers) with
which to carry out the scrutiny. It won’t also do to say that the conjunction
of (CR) and (P&T) is reasonable in its own lights, on its own criteria, as
self-subsuming. First, as we have already seen, such a self-subsumption
is too cheap to count as justification. Second, there is no way to judge
whether the conjunction of (CR) and (P&T) is self-subsuming, that is,
best survives criticisms given criticizers of the kind allowed by (P&T) —
perceptual and testimentory beliefs. You cannot criticize principles such as
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(CR) and (P&T) with perceptual and testimentory beliefs alone, because
no predictions about observable events or human actions or experiences
follow from such principles.
Generally, real critical practice, in science as well as outside it, would
be impossible without a lot of other considerations that cannot be justified
(even in terms of best surviving critical scrutiny) by appeals to perceptual
and testimentory beliefs (even as criticizers), such as economy, elegance,
common sense, or intuitive sense of plausibility, etc. Besides, various
perceptual and testimentory beliefs often conflict with one another, and
so one needs to resolve these conflicts, but one cannot do this by mere
appeals to some other perceptual and testimentory beliefs. (There is no
reason why these other beliefs should be preferred to the initial ones.) At
some points of critical discussion, when different considerations conflict,
one should just make one’s own unjustified judgment.
So, any rational discussion necessarily involves a lot of beliefs that are
acquired and held without justification (even in terms of best surviving
critical scrutiny), and these beliefs cannot be neatly taken inventory of, and
ordered hierarchically. There is no definite legitimate all-purpose founda-
tion for any rational discussion to proceed from. (The belief in some such
foundation would be that «commitment» against which Bartley advanced
non-justificationism.) Bartley was perfectly clear on this point:
Pancritical rationalist, like other people, holds countless unexamined
presuppositions and assumptions, many of which may be false. His ratio-
nality consists in his willingness to submit these to critical considerations
when he discovers them or when they are pointed out to him [. . . ] When
one belief is subjected to criticism, many others, of course, have to be
taken for granted — including those with which the criticism is being
carried out. The latter are used as the basis of criticism not because
they are themselves justified or beyond criticism, but because they are
unproblematical at present. These are, in that sense alone and during
that time alone, beyond criticism. We stop criticizing — temporarily —
not when we reach uncriticizable authorities, but when we reach positions
against which we can find no criticisms. If criticisms of these are raised
later, the critical process then continues.34 (Italics mine)
34Bartley W. The Retreat to Commitment. — P. 121-122.
See also Mark Notturno’s explanation:
Critical thinkers [. . . ] question and test the beliefs that others take for
granted. In so doing, they oftentimes clarify how some of their beliefs are
based upon others. But this basing of beliefs one upon another must ulti-
mately end. And if you are a critical thinker, then you will, somewhere in
the course of your tests, inevitably come upon statements that you believe
for no other reason than that they seem true — to you. In such a case, it
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3. Popper’s-Bartley’s non-justificationism: critical
discussion without unrevisable foundations
To put things in a nutshell, the non-justificationist (comprehensively
critical) rationalism is the response to the challenge of what may be called
«the commitment argument». The commitment argument is that, because
of the problem of the infinite justificatory regress (or vicious circulari-
ty), the following holds: (1) in our reasoning (arguing) we inevitably ulti-
mately appeal to some positions that are not supported by further reasons
(arguments) but accepted on credence, and (2) therefore, we have no escape
but to commit ourselves to these positions, hold them as uncriticizable
and unrevisable dogmas. (Comprehensively) critical rationalism meets this
challenge by admitting (1) and explaining that (2) does not follow and is
false: although any argument appeals to some positions taken as «basic»
relative to the argument, these need not be taken as basic in the absolute
sense; we may accept them tentatively for a while (as such that seem
unproblematic or, at least, credible enough), leaving open the possibility
of their problematization and revision as a result of further arguments.
To illuminate the non-justificationist (critical rationalist) conception
of rationality, it is useful to compare it with what Musgrave, in the book
Common Sense, Science and Scepticism (chapter 1), describes as the
answer to the problem of infinite regress by the philosophers he calls
«dogmatists» (which include classical rationalists and empiricists). The
«dogmatist» answer is based on the distinction between
immediate knowledge, which does not require further justification
and
mediated knowledge, which requires justification by immediate knowledge.
«Dogmatists» differ as to what is the source of immediate knowledge.
Some (called «empiricists») believe that it is experience (perceptions),
others (called «rationalists» or «intellectualists») — that it is reason (its
inherent indubitable ideas).35
What is CR’s view about immediate knowledge? Does it admit that
there is such knowledge? If yes, what kind of knowledge it is, perceptual
or inherent to reason?
would be more accurate to say not that such statements are justified, but
that they seem, in your judgment, to be true. (Notturno M. Science and
the Open Society. — p. 147)
35Musgrave A. Common Sense, Science and Scepticism. — P. 13-18.
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I think that it would be correct to say that CR agrees with «dogma-
tism» that there is «immediate knowledge» that does not require further
justification, or argumentative support. And CR admits that there is
«immediate knowledge» of both — «empiricist» and «rationalist» — kinds.
On the «empiricist» side, it is observational beliefs, on the «rationalist»
side, it is logics, common sense, some epistemological assumptions, inborn
or learned expectations, basic moral ideas, etc. Immediate knowledge
has as its sources experience, inborn expectations, intuition, etc. However,
unlike «dogmatism», CR does not dogmatize this «immediate knowledge».
CR denies that it is certain or highly probable (in the sense of the probabi-
lity calculus). CR also denies that it is unrevisable, that there is no way to
check and correct it. Instead, CR contends that «immediate knowledge»,
as well as mediated, is fallible and open to examination, critical discussion
and revision.
Besides, on the CR view, there is no neat demarcation between immedi-
ate and mediated knowledge. First, there are degrees: for example, in
science, an observational statement may be heavily theory-laden and so
pretty much mediated, but it is more immediate than the theory that it is
intended to test. Second, «immediate knowledge» can be criticized by other
— immediate or mediate — knowledge, and can be supported by yet other
— immediate or mediate — knowledge. When some points of «immedi-
ate knowledge» are challenged, we try to find reasons pro and contra and
weigh them up and make our reasoned judgment. And those reasons are
just appellations to other — immediate or mediate — knowledge.
Hence, there can be no overall inventory of «immediate knowledge» and
the relationships between its components. And «immediate knowledge»
has no absolutely «hard core» — ideas and principles which are absolutely
basic and, so, beyond the possibility of criticism and revision.
Besides, CR contends that all that «knowledge» is not knowledge in
the sense of justified true beliefs — it is conjectural knowledge with no
certificate (certainty) of truth or even high probability (in the sense of the
probability calculus).
The meaning of Popperian non-justificationism can be yet better
understood if we think of the purpose, raison d’etre, of the justification-
ist enterprise. Why do philosophers traditionally bother so much about
justification? Probably, the major motivation comes from the concept
of knowledge, as traditionally understood. The standard definition of
«knowledge» is «justified true belief». It was Plato who famously emphasi-
zed the difference between knowledge and mere true belief: for a person
to know that X, it is not enough that the person believed that X and that
42 Non-justificationism and Popper’s philosophy
X were the case; it is necessary also that the person had sufficient reasons
to believe that X, that is, was justified in believing that X. If a person has
a belief without sufficient reasons, and that belief happens to be true by
accident, the person does not really know. Now, for many centuries after
Plato, up to the present day, most philosophers concerned with knowledge
believed that this distinction — between knowledge and accidentally true
belief — is of supreme importance. Hence, they searched for the right way
to draw such a distinction: what should count as sufficient reasons? A lot
of different theories were proposed and opposed one another, and it seems
that there is no way to adjudicate between them impartially, except to
admit that they all are unsatisfactory because they fail to satisfy their
own requirement of being justified, except in a question-begging way
(relative to their own criteria). If so, the enterprise of justification looks
hopeless, and one can understand why it is so by merely thinking through
the logical situation — the problem of infinite justificatory regress that
«must, for logical reasons, be terminated by an arbitrary and irrational
appeal to what can be called dogmas or absolute presuppositions».36 The
alternative to such dogmatic commitment is to discard the justificationist
enterprise — the project of epistemology guided by Plato’s distinction
between knowledge as justified true belief and mere true belief. (Here, it
is appropriate to recollect Popper’s “provocative” claim that the best of
the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge, is not knowledge: it is not
composed of justified true beliefs.37)
However, discarding justificationism does not mean discarding reasons.
It does not even mean that any claim that a theory or a belief is justi-
fied is false. In ordinary language, one can talk of (tentative) justification
in the sense of providing arguments in favor of a position, or explaining
reasons why one holds or prefers it.38 Nothing is wrong with such a «justi-
fication»; however, we must be aware that it cannot bear anything like
the burden that justification is traditionally (in particular, by Plato and
Hume) required to bear.
It is worth noting that such a «justification-in-ordinary-language», or
substantiation, or argumentative support, besides being tentative, has a
36Bartley W. The Retreat to Commitment. — p. 221.
37Popper K. Realism and the Aim of Science. — pp. 12-13.
38Popper admitted that «giving reasons for one’s preference can of course be called
a justification (in ordinary language)», and added the reservations that «it is not a
justification in the sense criticized here», and that «our preferences are “justified” only
relative to the present state of our discussion» (Ibid. — p. 20). He also conceded that «to
have some “foundation”, or justification, may be important for a belief» but it should
not be required of scientific hypotheses (Ibid. — p. 22).
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«more-or-less» rather than «either-or» character. Instead of dividing posi-
tions into justified and unjustified, we evaluate the balance of reasons pro
and contra as more-or-less favoring-or-disfavoring the position at issue.
And this makes us accept or decline the position (as likely to be true or
a good enough approximation to the truth) tentatively, without committ-
ing ourselves to its truth or falsity, leaving widely open the possibility of
revision.
If my construal is right, Popperian non-justificationism can be «posi-
tively» redescribed as «evaluationism»: its point is that we should be
interested in evaluation of arguments (in terms of validity, soundness, and
weightiness) and positions (in terms of truth, falsity and verisimilitude),
and do not bother about justification. Justificationism makes for a defen-
sive attitude that is not conductive to the development of knowledge; it
is as if our beliefs are accused of being non-legitimate, or we are accused
of holding such non-legitimate beliefs, and now we are expected to justify
them, or ourselves. Unlike this, evaluationist attitude is explorative: we
try to find out reasons (arguments) pro and contra a position at issue,
evaluate their strength and balance, and, as a result, tentatively accept or
decline the position.
Note, that the above-mentioned defensive attitude makes no sense,
because belief-acquiring or belief-holding (believing that X is the case)
is not a matter of deliberate choice, and so requires no justification. We
believe something because we are led to believe it by our experiences and
various considerations and arguments we had encountered — not because
we have chosen to believe it. A person cannot decide that from such-
and-such a moment she will start believing such-and-such a proposition,
and implement the decision. If so, a person cannot be reasonably held
responsible for her beliefs, and the idea that we need to justify our beliefs
makes no sense. However, a person can be reasonably invited to consider
the arguments (reasons) for and against a position, which may result in
changes in the person’s beliefs.
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